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1 Introduction
Policy makers have become increasingly aware of the possible use of transfer prices as
a device for shifting prots into low tax jurisdictions. Transfer pricing policies have
important implications since exports and imports from related parties are a dominant
portion of trade ows  see Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2009). To moderate the
incentives for rms to use transfer prices to shift prots from high to low tax ju-
risdictions for reasons unrelated to the economic nature of the transactions, most
governments follow taxation policies that are based on the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, which recommend
that, for tax purposes, internal pricing policies be consistent with the Arms Length
Principle (ALP); i.e., that transfer prices between companies of multinational enter-
prises for tax purposes be established on a market value basis, thus comparable to
transactions between independent (unrelated) parties -see [21].
Transfer prices serve both the purpose of allocating costs to di¤erent subsidiaries
and determine tax liability of parents and subsidiaries. Aware of this problem, a
growing number of multinational rms use an internal transfer price that di¤ers from
those used for tax purposes. This is a legal practice in the OECD countries. The only
constraint is that transfer prices for tax purposes must be consistent with the ALP.
Given that there is no statutory requirement, the incentive and tax transfer prices
may di¤er. Therefore, an immediate question is whether rms separate their internal
transfer prices from those used for tax purposes.
Using the terminology of Hyde and Choe (2005) and Dürr and Göx (2011), when
rms use the same transfer price for tax reporting and for providing incentives, it is
said that they keep one set of books, and when rms use di¤erent transfer prices for
each purpose, it is said that they keep two sets of books.
In the absence of delegation, the choice between keeping one or two sets of books
is not a matter. Thus, the strategic role of accounting policy is not driven by the
oligopolistic market setting rather than by the decentralization of decision making.
Under delegation, the choice between keeping one or two sets of books is relevant,
even if tax rates are equal across jurisdictions.
Regarding theoretical studies on the optimal accounting strategy by decentralized
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rms which comply with tax rules, results are not conclusive. Specically, these
results depend on considering the presence of competition. Empirical evidence on the
use of alternative accounting system is also mixedsee Dürr and Göx (2011) for a
review of this literature.
First, abstracting from competition consideration, theoretical literature on this
topic has established the superiority of keeping two sets of books whenever the tax
and incentives objectives are conicting -see Baldenius, Melumad and Reichelstein
(2004).
Second, considering the possibility of competition, Göx (2000) and Dürr and Göx
(2011) study the equilibrium accounting and transfer pricing policies in a multina-
tional duopoly with price competition in the nal product market. They nd that the
rms in a duopoly can benet from strategically using the same transfer price for tax
and managerial purposes instead of using separate transfer prices for both objectives.
According to their results, rms in industries with a small number of competitors can
benet from using the same transfer price for tax and managerial purposes even if
the tax and managerial objectives are conicting. Therefore if rms keep one set of
books, ALP may reinforces the e¤ect of vertical separation in softening competition
see Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Alles and Datar
(1998).
In this paper, taking compliance with the tax rules as given (i.e., transfer prices for
tax purposes are consistent with the ALP); we study the optimal accounting strategy
by decentralized multinational rms which compete in quantities in a context of
imperfect competition.1
As Göx (2000), Arya and Mittendorf (2008) and Dürr and Göx (2011), we believe
the accounting policy serves as commitment device since it is not often changed given
the administrative and consulting costs associated with these changes.2 Moreover,
1Quantity competition provides a reduced form model for the analysis of more complex forms of
imperfect competition; e.g., capacity choice followed by some kind of price competition -see Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983) and Moreno and Ubeda (2006).
2Other means of competitive commitment have been detailed in the literature, including dis-
torting managerial compensation -Fershtman and Judd, (1987); Sklivas, (1987)-, sinking capacity
investments -Dixit, (1980); Spence, (1977)-, building inventories -Ware, (1985)-, limiting information
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accounting policies tend to be a matter of public record (in, for example, management
discussion in annual reports, SEC lings and tax authority pricing agreements).
In our framework there are two markets, which we refer to as the Latin market
(or home market) and the Greek market (or external market). There are two rms
engaging in Cournot competition in the Latin market. These rms have subsidiaries,
which in turn engage in Cournot competition in the Greek market. As customary, we
assume that parents maximize consolidated prots, while subsidiaries maximize their
own prots. Since competition in the Latin market provides a market price to impose
on comparable market transactions, parents use this price to satisfy both cost and tax
accounting requirements if keeping one set of books. If parents keep two sets of books,
Latin market provides a market price only for tax purposes. Specically, the analysis
is based on a three stage non-cooperative game under complete information. Parents
choose their accounting policy and then compete in quantities in a home market and
set the prices at which they sell the good to their subsidiaries (either directly or
indirectly via their output choices), which in turn compete in quantities an external
market. (The decisions of the subsidiaries in the third stage are solely determined by
the outcome of the second stage game.3) We show that parentsaccounting policies
determine the properties of market outcomes. Moreover, we obtain that collusion
may be sustained in equilibrium. Before characterizing equilibria of this game, we
analyze the properties of each subgames (i.e.; when both rms keep one set of books,
when both rms keep two sets of books, as well when one rm keeps one set of books
and the other keeps two sets of books).
In the subgame where both parents adopt one set of books (i.e., a parent must
transfer the good to its subsidiary at the home market price), parent output decisions
must internalize its impact on the transfer price of its subsidiary, and its subsidiarys
rival. One set of books thus provides parents with an instrument to soften competition
acquisition -Einy et al., (2002); Gal-Or, (1988)-, and cost allocation rules -Gal-Or, (1993); Hughes
and Kao, (1998).
3Since the outcome of the rst stage game becomes known before the market stage of the game,
the subsidiaries can infer the corresponding internal transfer price from their knowledge about
the other rms accounting policy and perfectly predict its internal transfer price even if it is not
observable per se -see Alles and Datar (1998).
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in the external market. Since a parent inuences its transfer price via its output
decision in the home market, competition is more aggressive in this market. Total
prots under one set of books are above prots at the equilibrium where parents and
subsidiaries are integrated. Hence using one set of books may provide a rationale for
vertical separation. Implications of introducing taxes under one set of books are as
follows. If tax rates are equal across jurisdictions, maximizing the gross or net process
lead to the same result. If tax rates are di¤erent across jurisdictions, using one set
of books also provides tax saving. In particular, when the external market o¤ers a
tax advantage over the home market, quantity in the home market is cut in order to
increase the transfer price and therefore, every additional unit sold in the external
market at a transfer price reduces the rms tax bill. Nevertheless, in this setting
what prevents a parent from decreasing its output further is that a cut in output also
reduces its subsidiarys rival tax bill.
In the subgame where both parents adopt two sets of books (i.e., parent rms
use internal transfer price that di¤ers from that used for tax purposes), internal
transfer prices open up the possibility to gain a Stackelberg advantage in the external
market. Parents reduce their internal transfer prices below marginal cost in order
to take advantage in the external market, creating a short of prisoners dilemma.
Implications of introducing taxes under two sets of books are as follows. If tax rates
are equal across jurisdictions, maximizing the gross or net prot lead to a di¤erent
result: a parent has an incentive to reduce the market price in the home market by
increasing its output and at the same time reduces its internal transfer price, thus
increasing its subsidiarys rival tax liability without a¤ecting the marginal cost of its
own subsidiary. Therefore, if both rms keep two sets of books together with a transfer
pricing regulation consistent with the ALP competition intensies in both markets
relative to the equilibrium where parents and subsidiaries are integrated. Thus if tax
rates are equal across jurisdictions, neither benet from competition consideration
nor tax bill savings exists when parents use two sets of books. Nevertheless if tax
rates are di¤erent across jurisdictions, this accounting policy may reduce tax bill.
In the subgame with asymmetric accounting policies (i.e., one parent choosing
one set of books and other parent choosing two sets of books), parent using two sets
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of books becomes the dominant producer in the external market, since its internal
transfer price is lower than home market price, while parent using one set of books
becomes the dominant producer in the home market because increasing its output in
this market alleviates the double marginalization that arises in the external market.
The total output (total prots) in both markets are above (below) the standard
Cournot level. Nevertheless prots of the parent using two sets of books exceed this
level.
Adding the rst stage to the game, whereby parents choose their accounting policy,
leads to a variety of equilibrium depending on market sizes and tax rates. Restricting
attention to (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibrium, the possible types of the
game varies from a prisonersdilemma (with a unique Pareto ine¢ cient Nash equi-
librium in which both parents choose two sets of books) to a game of chicken (with
two pure strategy Nash equilibria, in these equilibria one rm uses one set of books
and the other uses two sets of books) or a coordination game (with two pure strategy
Nash equilibria, one in which both parents choose two sets of books, and another
one in which choose one set of books). Also, parameter constellations of market sizes
and tax rates can be found such the type of the game is a cooperation game (with
a unique Pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium in which both parents choose one set of
books).
Parents strategic behavior implies that keeping one set of books may be sustained
as an equilibrium for most of the size di¤erence between markets, when the tax rates
are high. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique when the both markets are similar in
size.
Our analysis contributes to the transfer pricing literature by broadening the un-
derstanding of the potential incentives for the choice of the accounting policy. A
central premise in most related literature is that multinational rms set the same
transfer price for tax and incentive purposes (i.e., keeping one set of books) see
Schjelderup and Sorgard (1997), Korn and Lengsfeld (2007), Nielsen et al. (2008)
and Lemus and Moreno (2011). In these papers one set of books is taken as given
and is not a matter of choice. Here we endogenize that choice and show that one set
of books may be sustained as an equilibrium under broad conditions.
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Since keeping one set of books provides parents with an instrument to soften
competition in the external market, our analysis o¤ers a convincing explanation of
how the choice of the accounting policy can serve as a precommitment device. In our
setting, regulatory constraint (i.e., transfer prices for tax purposes must be consistent
with the ALP) commits the rms to the adoption of a particular accounting policy
(i.e., one or two sets of books).4
In addition, our model contributes to the literature on strategic delegation by
broadening the understanding of the potential benets of decentralization, an orga-
nizational structure whose motivation is not well understood when rms compete in
quantities. Dürr and Göx (2011) analyzed this question when rms compete in prices.
Their results reinforce the e¤ect of vertical separation in softening competition when
rms keep one set of books. Nevertheless, novelty of their results is limited since
analogous conclusions, when rms compete in prices, were found by Vickers (1985).
Our analysis does not only broaden the theoretical understanding but it also
provides testable empirical predictions depending on the di¤erences in the market
size and tax rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup. Section
3 provides an equilibrium analysis under one set of books. Section 4 derives results
for two sets of books. Section 5 studies the equilibrium with asymmetric accounting
policies. Section 6 characterizes equilibria of this three stage non-cooperative game.
Section 7 concludes.
4Arya and Mittendorf (2008) analyze market based transfer pricing as a strategic response in a
similar setting. They show that ALP makes rms more aware of that excessive home market prices
depress external production (i.e., the concern is about double marginalization) and may be more
aggressive in the home market as a result. However, they do not recognize that ALP increases the
prevailing transfer prices and thereby mitigate the prisoners dilemma in transfer pricing to get an
edge in downstream competition. In their model, parents rely on intracompany discounts to manage
tensions between the home and the external markets. Intracompany discounts are set prior to the
stage of competition in the home market and serve as a precommitment device. Nevertheless, this
device is somewhat contrived since parents must credibly bind themselves to these discounts. In
our setting, it is regulatory restriction (i.e., ALP) that serves to credibly convey to external parties
that the related party price is above marginal cost (when one set of books is the accounting policy
chosen by both parents).
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2 Model and Preliminaries
A good is sold in two markets, which we refer to as the Latin market and the
Greek market. The inverse demands in the Latin and Greek markets are pd(q) =
max f0; 1  bqg and d() = max f0; 1  g, respectively, where b and  are pos-
itive real numbers. Assuming that demands are linear facilitates the analysis and
makes it easier to interpret the results. We assume that maximum willingness to pay
in each market is equal.5 Di¤erences in the slope of the demands (i.e., of the para-
meters b and ) capture the impact of di¤erences in the market size the demand is
greater the smaller the slope. The parameter s := b= is a proxy for the size of Latin
market relative to that of the Greek market.6
The taxable income in the Latin and Greek markets is determined by this tax 
and  + , respectively. The parameter  is the di¤erential tax rates of the Greek
relative to the Latin market. Tax rates are assumed to be less than 1, reecting the
idea that policy makers are unable or unwilling to tax multinational rms with a 100
per cent prot taxation.7 When  > 0 ( < 0), the Latin (Greek) market is a tax
heaven.
There are two rms producing the good at same constant marginal cost, which is
assumed to be zero without loss of generality. Firms engage in Cournot competition in
the Latin market, and have subsidiaries which in turn engage in Cournot competition
in the Greek market.
We assume throughout that for tax purposes transfer prices must be consistent
with the ALP; i.e., that the taxable income of a subsidiary that produces i is (  
p)i, where  and p are the market prices in the Greek and Latin markets, respectively.
Under this assumption the consolidated prots of rm i as a function of parents and
5Lemus and Moreno (2011) provide an equilibrium analysis when rms use one set of books, in
which willingness to pay in each market are di¤erent.
6This assumption about willingness to pay holds if preferences over the good and/or range of
income per capita are similar in the Latin market and in the Greek market. As regards market sizes,
 > b occurs if the number of people demanding the good in the Latin market is larger than in the
Greek market.
7Dynamic allocative distortions associated with taxations (100 per cent prot taxation removes
all incentive to do one thing rather than another) place constraints on prot taxation.
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subsidiaries outputs is
i(q1; q2; 1; 2) = (1)
= (1  ) pd(q1 + q2)qi + (1    )d (1 + 2)i +pd(q1 + q2)i:
We refer to the case where parents use the same transfer prices for internal and
tax purposes as keeping one set of books. If a parent rm uses an internal transfer
price that di¤ers from that used for tax purposes, its subsidiary receives the good
at a transfer price ti (which is a non market based transfer prices) but the taxable
incomes of the parent and subsidiary are determined by p. We refer to this case as
keeping two sets of books.
Parent rms seek to maximize after tax consolidated prots, independently of
whether they keep one or two sets of books; since the cost of production is zero, the
consolidated prots are just the sum of the after tax revenues of the parent and the
subsidiary. A subsidiary maximizes its own prot, which is the di¤erence, after tax,
between its revenue and its cost. A subsidiaryunit cost is just its transfer price. We
identify a parent and its subsidiary rm with the same subindex i 2 f1; 2g.
In the absence of delegation, the choice between keeping one or two sets of books
is not a matter. If parents do not delegate but rather compete in quantities also in
the Greek market, the equilibrium outcome in both markets is independent of type of
accounting.8 In particular, if tax rates in both markets are identical, the equilibrium
outcome is just the Cournot outcome in both markets.
In the Cournot equilibrium of a duopoly where the market demand is P d(Q) =
maxf0,1   BQg, rmsconstant marginal costs are (c1; c2) 2 R2+ and the taxable
income is determined by this tax  , the market price PC , the output QCi and prot
Ci of rm i are
(PC ; QCi ;
C
i ) =
 
1 + c1 + c2
3
;
1  2ci + c3 i
3B
;
(1  ) (1  2c1 + c2)2
9B
!
: (2)
If the market is monopolized by a single rm whose constant marginal cost is
c 2 R+, then the market equilibrium price PM , output QM , and the rms prot M
8Hyde and Choe (2005) observe this fact in a monopoly setting.
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are
(PM ; QM ;M) =
 
1 + c
2
;
1  c
2B
;
(1  ) (1  c)2
4B
!
: (3)
Using these formulae (2), we readily calculate the Latins market Cournot equi-
librium price pC , output qCi = q
C and prot Ci = 
C
L of rm i as
(pC ; qC ;CL) =

1
3
;
1
3b
;
1  
9b

: (4)
Using the formulae (3), we obtain the monopoly equilibrium price, output, and
the monopolys prot in the Latin market as
(pM ; qM ;ML ) =

1
2
;
1
2b
;
1  
4b

: (5)
When aggregate output is q, the total surplus generated in the market is given by
S(q) =

1  Bq
2

q: (6)
In the Latin market, the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium, SCL , is therefore
SCL =
4
9b
; (7)
and the surplus at monopoly equilibria, SML , is
SML =
3
8b
: (8)
Replacing b with  yields formulas analogous for the Cournot and monopoly
equilibria in the Greek market. (These formulas assume that rmsconstant marginal
cost of production is zero). We use the notation C , C , CG, S
C
G , and 
M , M ,
MG , S
M
G , for the values of output, price, prot and surplus at the Cournot duopoly
equilibrium, and monopoly equilibrium of the market, respectively.
3 One Set of Books
In this section, we assume that parents use the market price in the Latin market as
the transfer price per intrarm transaction, i.e., parents keep only one set of books
to satisfy both cost and tax accounting requirements. Of course, this internal pricing
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scheme is consist with the ALP. We identify the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE
henceforth) of the game. In this setup, parents act as leaders anticipating the
reactions of subsidiary rms.
Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p  0, each subsidiary i 2 f1; 2g
chooses its output i to solve
max
i2R+
(1    ) (d (1 + 2)  p)i:
Here p is the constant marginal cost of the subsidiary rms.9 Using the formulae (2),
we calculate the equilibrium outputs and price for p  0 as
1 = 

2 = ^(p) =
1  p
3
:
(Note that in the game played by subsidiaries equilibrium is unique.) The equilibrium
outcome depends only on p, but do not depend directly on the tax rate in the Greek
market ( +).
Therefore, the equilibrium price in the Greek market is
 = d (2^(p)) =
1 + 2p
3
:
A SPE of the game is prole of actions for parents 1 and 2, (q1; q

2), and a pair
of functions describing the subsidiaries strategies (f1 (q

1; q

2) ; f

2 (q

1; q

2)) such that
parents maximize consolidated prots and subsidiaries maximize their own prots.
Then in a SPE the subsidiaries strategies are f i (q

1; q

2) = ^i(p
d(q1; q

2)) for i 2 f1; 2g,
and parents, anticipating that subsidiaries reactions are described by (^1; ^2), choose
their actions in order to maximize consolidated prots (Oi ). Thus, Parent i chooses
its output qi in order to solve
max
qi2R+
Oi (q1; q2);
where
Oi (q1; q2) = i(q1; q2; ^1
 
pd(q1 + q2)

; ^2
 
pd(q1 + q2)

);
9Dürr and Göx (2011) assume that rms can arbitrarily choose a transfer price from an allow-
able exogenous range of ALP prices, withstanding a possible examination of authorities in the two
markets.
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continue to be the same formula as given by (1).
The rst-order condition for prot maximizing is
@Oi
@qi
= (1  )

dpd
dq
qi + p
d

+ (1  ) dp
d
dq

@^
@p
^i +
@^i
@p
^

+
+
dpd
dq

^i

1  @^
@p

+
@^i
@p
(^   p)

= 0: (9)
The expression in (9) comprises three di¤erent terms. In what follows, we refer
to rst term as Cournot marginal revenue, to second term as competition e¤ect10
and to the last term as tax e¤ect11. Competition e¤ect is a consequence of vertical
separation (i.e., delegation).
In the absence of delegation and taxation, the optimal quantity in each market is
found by equating Cournot marginal revenue with marginal cost (which in the model
is zero). In particular, the equilibrium in both markets is just Cournot output.
The sign of competition e¤ect depends on the price level in the Latin market and
the sign of tax e¤ect depends on the sign of :
For pd > 3
4
pC , the inuence that competition e¤ect has on the marginal prot of
parent i is positive from
(1  ) dp
d
dq

@^
@p
^i +
@^i
@p
^

= (1  ) 4s
9

pd   3
4
pC

;
in (9), so that the optimal quantity in this market, ceteris paribus, is above the
Cournot output. Intuitively, this quantity increase is favorable because it reduces
the Latin market price and therefore, alleviates the double marginalization problem.
Nevertheless, double marginalization problem remains (i.e., pd > 0). By charging
transfer prices above marginal cost (zero in this model) both parents can commit
their subsidiaries to behave as softer competitors on the nal product market. In
10Since Latin market price are observable, a parent takes into account that it can inuence this
price via its output decision in the Latin market. Thus, rms can use Latin market price strategically
to a¤ect output decisions for the external market. In this setting, a high Latin market price can be
used to reduce the competition in the external market.
11If tax rates di¤er among jurisdiction, rms want to shift prots into the low tax jurisdictions
by use of distorted transfer prices.
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this setting, a parent takes into account that it can inuence its transfer price only
via its output decision in the Latin market. Hence, a parent output decision must
internalize its impact on the transfer price of its subsidiary, and its subsidiarys rival.
Therefore one set of books provides parents with an instrument to soften competition
in the external market.
For  > 0 the inuence that tax e¤ect has on the marginal prot of parent i is
negative from

dpd
dq

^i

1  @^
@p

+
@^i
@p
(^   p)

=  2s
9

 
1  pd ;
in (9), so that the optimal output in this market, ceteris paribus, is lower than output
in a setting without taxes (or with equal tax rates between markets). Intuitively, this
quantity reduction is favorable because it increases the transfer price and every addi-
tional unit that is sold in the Greek market at a transfer price reduces the subsidiarys
tax bill.
In this setting, what prevents a parent from decreasing its output further in order
to increase Latin market price is that a decrease in output also reduces its subsidiarys
rival tax bill. The opposite holds for  < 0.
For  > 0 the inuence that tax e¤ect has on the marginal prot of subsidiary
i is also negative. Intuitively, increasing p, given that tax e¤ect in the Latin market
is negative, acts as a marginal cost increase for subsidiaries. The opposite holds for
 < 0.
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order condition of parents 1
and 2, we obtain their outputs
q1 = q

2 =
(1  ) (3b+ 9)
b ((1  ) (8b+ 27) + 4b) := q
O: (10)
The equilibrium price in the Latin market is
pd(2qO) =
(1  ) (2b+ 9) + 4b
(1  ) (8b+ 27) + 4b := p
O:
Substituting the value of p in equations ^i(p) and ^(p) above, we obtain the sub-
sidiariesoutputs,
1 = 

2 = ^(p
O) =
(1  ) (2b+ 6)
 ((1  ) (8b+ 27) + 4b) := 
O; (11)
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and the equilibrium price in the Greek market,
d(2O) =
(1  ) (4b+ 15) + 4b
(1  ) (8b+ 27) + 4b := 
O:
Note that if the taxes di¤erential was zero (i.e.,  = 0), this outcome would also
be optimal in a setting without taxes and maximizing the gross or net prots leads
to the same result. For  > 0, the output in both markets decreases with . The
opposite e¤ect applies to the equilibrium quantity for < 0. Since prices in the Latin
market increase with , parents save on tax payments by using one set of books.
In particular, if  = 0 and using (4) we can rewrite the expression for rms
output in the Latin market (10) as
qO = qC +
1
3 (8b+ 27)
:
Likewise, using the equation (5) we can write the expression for rmsoutput in the
Greek market (11) as
O =
M
2
  3
4 (8b+ 27)
:
Thus, the output in the Latin market is above the Cournot output and the output in
the Greek market is below the Cournot output. Note also that double marginalization
imposed by ALP leads to an output in the Greek market that is below the monopoly
output.
We have
@qO
@
=   9
(8b+ 27)2
< 0;
and
@O
@b
=
6
(8b+ 27)2
> 0:
The output in the Latin (Greek) market decreases (increases) with  (b). It is worth-
while responding to an increase of the Greek market size (i.e., a smaller ) with an
increase of the output in the Latin market, thus reducing the transfer price (in order
to alleviate the double marginalization problem) and avoiding a large reduction of
the sales of the subsidiary.
The equilibrium output in the Latin market also satises
lim
!0
qO = qC +
1
24b
:= qO0 ;
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and
lim
!1
qO = qC :
Thus, as the size of the Greek market becomes large (i.e.,  becomes small), the
output in the Latin market is above the Cournot output. Parents incentive to increase
their output in order to alleviate double marginalization remains as the size of the
Greek market becomes arbitrarily large. Of course, as the size of the Greek market
becomes arbitrarily small (i.e.,  approaches innity), parents tend to ignore the
double marginalization problem (as the prots in this market become negligible),
and focus on the impact on their output decision on the Latin market, and their
output approaches the Cournot output.
The equilibrium output in the Greek market satises
lim
b!1
O =
M
2
;
and
lim
b!0
O = C   1
9
=
M
2
  1
36
:= O0 :
Thus, as the size of the Latin market becomes arbitrarily small (i.e., b approaches
innity), the revenues in this market become negligible, and parents output decisions
mainly serve the purpose of committing to high prices in the Greek market.
Interestingly, keeping one set of books (i.e., internal transfer prices are consistent
with the ALP) allows parents to attain perfect cooperation (i.e., they are able to
sustain the monopoly outcome) when b approaches innity. In this case, ALP is
merely an instrument to avoid competition in the Greek market. When the size of
the Latin market becomes arbitrarily large (i.e., b approaches zero), however, revenues
mainly come from the Latin market and therefore, parents tend to ignore the impact
of double marginalization in the Greek market, producing the Cournot output in the
Latin market. Double marginalization leads to an output in the Greek market that
is below the monopoly output.
Let us study the total prot and total surplus under one set of books. Total prots
can be calculated using (1) and (4) as
O = OL +
O
G = 
C
L +
C
G +
2 (1  )
9
4s2 + 22s+ 27
 (8s+ 27)2
; (12)
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and the total surplus can be calculated using (6) and (7) as
SOL + S
O
G = S
C
L + S
C
G  
2
9
20s2 + 155s+ 297
 (8s+ 27)2
:
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If both rms use one set of books and  = 0, then in a SPE:
(1.1) The output in the Latin market qO is above the Cournot outcome, and in-
creases with the size of the Greek market , i.e.,
qO > qC and
@qO
@
< 0;
and the output in the Greek market O is below the Cournot outcome, and decreases
with the size of the Latin market b, i.e.,
O < C and
@O
@b
> 0:
Further, as  becomes large qO approaches qC , and as  becomes small qO approaches
qO0 , where q
O
0 > q
C . And as b becomes large O approaches M=2, and as b becomes
small O approaches O0 < 
C , where O0 < 
M=2.
(1.2) The total prots are above the total prots at the Cournot equilibrium.
(1.3) The total surplus is below the total surplus at the Cournot equilibrium.
Keeping one set of books provides parent rms with an instrument to limit aggres-
sive competition in the Greek market, and may allow them to encourage an outcome
near the monopoly outcome when the size of the Greek market relative to that of the
Latin market is large.12 Of course, since a parent inuences its transfer price only via
its output decision in the Latin market, competition in this market is more aggressive
and the output is above the Cournot output. Nevertheless, total prots are above at
the Cournot prot. Thus, this accounting policy may provide a rationale for vertical
12Choe and Matsushima (2012) examine the e¤ect of ALP on dynamic competition in imperfectly
competitive markets and show that the ALP renders tacit collusion more stable. They consider a
vertically related market with two upstream rms which supply to their downstream a¢ liate and
other unrelated buyers in the downstream market. In applying the ALP, they consider as comparable
uncontrolled price, the price the upstream rms charges unrelated buyers. In our setting, it is
competition in the home market provides a reliable measure of an arms length result.
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separation. However, total surplus is below the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium,
which raises some questions about the use of the ALP as a guideline for regulating
transfer prices.
4 Two Sets of Books
We consider next the case where each parent uses two sets of books together with
a transfer pricing regulation consistent with the ALP. In this scenario, subsidiary
is taxable income is (d (1 + 2)   p)i, where p is the price in the Latin market,
whereas its gross prot is
 
d (1 + 2)  ti

i, where ti is the internal transfer price
that parent i uses to allocate costs. Parent is consolidated net prot as a function
of the outputs of parents and subsidiaries continue to be the same formula as given
by (1), i(q1,q2,1,2). We identify the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE henceforth)
of the game as follows.
Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p 2 R+ and internal transfer prices
are (t1; t2) 2 R, each subsidiary i 2 f1; 2g chooses its output i to solve
max
i2R+
 
d (1 + 2)  ti

i   ( +) (d (1 + 2)  p)i:
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order condition of subsidiaries 1
and 2, we calculate their equilibrium outputs as
1 = 

2 = ~1(p; t1; t2) = ~2(p; t1; t2) =
1    + ( +) p  2t
i
+ t
3 i
3 (1    ) :
(Note that in the game played by subsidiaries equilibrium is unique.) The outcome in
the Greek market depends on p, ti and tax rate in the Greek market (depends on tax
rate in the Greek market even if tax rates in both markets are identical; i.e.,  = 0).
Assuming that ~1(p; t1; t2) + ~2(p; t1; t1)  1 , the market price is
~(p; t1; t2) = 
d(~1(p; t1; t2) + ~2(p; t1; t2))
=
1      2 ( +) p+ t1 + t2
3 (1    ) :
A SPE of the game is prole of actions for parents 1 and 2, (q1; q

2; t

1; t

2), and a pair
of functions describing the subsidiaries strategies (f 1 (q

1; q

2; t

1; t

2) ; f

2 (q

1; q

2; t

1; t

2))
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such that parents maximize consolidated prots and subsidiaries maximize their own
prots. Then in a SPE the subsidiaries strategies are
f i (q

1; q

2; t

1; t

2) = ~i(p
d(q1; q

2); t

1; t

2) for i 2 f1; 2g;
and parents, anticipating that subsidiaries reactions are described by (~1; ~2), choose
their actions in order to maximize consolidated prots (Ti ). Thus, Parent i chooses
its output qi and its internal transfer price ti in order to solve
max
(ti;qi)2RR+
Ti (q1; q2; t1; t2);
where
Ti (q1; q2; t1; t2) = i(q1; q2; ~1(p
d(q1 + q2); t1; t2); ~2(p
d(q1 + q2); t1; t2)):
Parent is rst-order conditions for prot maximization are
@Ti
@ti
= (1    )

@~
@ti
~i +
@~i
@ti
~

+

@~i
@ti
p

= 0; (13)
and
@Ti
@qi
= (1  )

p+
dpd
dq
qi

+ (1  ) dp
d
dq

@~
@p
~i +
@~i
@p
~

+
+
dpd
dq

~i

1  @~
@p

+
@~i
@p
(~   p)

= 0: (14)
The expression in (13) comprises two di¤erent terms. Using the same terminology
as before, we refer to the rst term as the competition e¤ect on the internal transfer
price ti13 and to the second term as tax e¤ect on the internal transfer price ti.
The sign of competition e¤ect on the internal transfer price depends on the output
level in the Greek market and the sign of tax e¤ect on the internal transfer price
depends on the sign of :
For ~i <
6
5
C the inuence that the competition e¤ect has on the marginal prot
of parent i is negative from
(1    )

@~
@ti
~i +
@~i
@ti
~

=
5
3

~i  
6
5
C

;
13Parent can use the internal transfer prices strategically to impact output decisions for the
external market. In this setting, a low transfer price can be used to expand own market share in
the external market.
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in (13), so that the internal transfer price ti, ceteris paribus, is lower than the marginal
cost (zero in this model).14 Note ti is the constant marginal cost of the subsidiary
rm. Intuitively, the internal transfer price ti is lower than the marginal cost in order
to render each subsidiary into a low cost competitor that behaves aggressively by
increasing its quantity. The transfer price that optimizes managerial incentives ti
(which is a non market transfer pricing) opens up the possibility to gain a Stackel-
berg advantage in the Greek market. By reducing its internal transfer price below
marginal cost, parents attempt to gain a kind of Stackelberg leader status, creating
a short of prisonersdilemma situation. As a consequence of the competition e¤ect,
the equilibrium outcome in the Greek market is more e¢ cient than the Cournot out-
come. Therefore in the absence of taxation, delegating output decision to subsidiaries
encourages parents to compete more aggressively in the Greek market, relative to a
setting in which parents exercise direct control of the subsidiarys output.
For  > 0 the inuence that tax e¤ect has on the marginal prot of parent i is
also negative from


@~i
@ti
p

=   2p
3 (1    ) ;
in (13), so that the internal transfer price ti, ceteris paribus, is lower if Latin market
o¤ers a tax advantage over the Greek market. Intuitively, this cost reduction is
favorable because it o¤sets the increase in its subsidiarys taxable income that occurs
by the competition e¤ect. The opposite holds for  < 0.
The expression in (14) comprises three di¤erent terms. Again using the above
terminology, we refer to rst term as Cournot marginal revenue, to the second term
as the competition e¤ect on the output qi and to the third term as the tax e¤ect on
the output qi.
The signs of competition e¤ect and tax e¤ect on the output qi depend on the
output level in the Greek market and on , respectively:
For ~i >
3C
4
the inuence that the competition e¤ect has on the marginal prot
of parent i is positive from
14If internal transfer price was equal to the marginal cost, the outcome in the Greek market would
be Cournot outcome.
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(1  ) dp
d
dq

@~
@p
~i +
@~i
@p
~

= (1  ) 4b ( +)
3 (1    )

~i  
3C
4

;
in (14), so that the output in the Latin market, ceteris paribus, is above the output
at the Cournot equilibrium. Intuitively, this quantity increase is favorable because it
rises the tax liability of its subsidiarys rival without a¤ecting the marginal cost of its
own subsidiary. Each parent can o¤set exactly its own tax liability increase, reducing
its internal transfer price.
For  > 0 the inuence that the tax e¤ect has on the marginal prot of parent i
is negative from

dpd
dq

~i

1  @~
@p

+
@~i
@p
(1  2~i   p)

=  s (1  p) ( +) + 3b (1    ) ~i
3 (1    ) ;
in (14), so that the output in this market, ceteris paribus, is lower if the Latin market
is a tax heaven. Intuitively, this quantity reduction is favorable because it increases
the transfer price and therefore reduces the rms tax bill. The opposite holds for
 < 0.
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order conditions of parents 1
and 2 we obtain their outputs and the internal transfer prices. In the Latin market,
parentsoutputs are
q1 = q

2 = q
C +
1

d ( ;)
 ( ;; s)
:= qT ;
where
d ( ;) =  (1  )  
3
(2 (1    ) + (1 + )) ;
and
 ( ;; s) = 15 (1  )2  (15 (1  )  2s (  )) :
Assuming that 2qT  1
b
, the market price is
pd(2qT ) = pC   2s d ( ;)
 ( ;; s)
:= pT :
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Equilibrium internal transfer prices are t1 = t

2 := t
T , where
tT =  1
5
  10 (1  ) (s   4 (1  ))
5 ( ;; s)
 2 (s (   (6  5)) + 5 (1  ) (4   (1    )))
5 ( ;; s)
:
Substituting the values pT and tT in equations above we obtain the subsidiaries
outputs
1 = 

2 = ~1(p
; t1; t

2) = ~2(p
; t1; t

2) =
6
5
C   

 ( ;; s)
 ( ;; s)
:= T ;
and market price in the Greek market,
d(2T ) =
3
5
C + 2
 ( ;; s)
 ( ;; s)
:= T ;
where  ( ;; s) = 4
5
s (  )  2 (1  ).
For > 0, the output in the Latin market decreases with if  < 1
2
(see Appendix
1 for a proof of this assertion). Thus the tax e¤ect on the output qi prevails over the
competition e¤ect. Tax incentives make a high price desirable and therefore, parents
increase the market price in the home market by reducing their outputs. Since Latin
market price increases with , parents save on tax payments by using two sets of
books.
Increased tax rates on the Greek market may have a pro-competitive e¤ect in
this market by encouraging lower internal transfer price. Thus the reduction in the
internal transfer price may prevail over the increase of tax bill as a result of increased
tax rates and prices in the Latin market. Whether or not output in the Greek market
decreases with  depends on the size di¤erence between markets and on the value of
. (see Appendix 2 for a proof of this assertion).
In particular assuming that  = 0 and using again (4), we can rewrite the ex-
pression for rmsoutput in the Latin market as
qT =
(
3
2
qC   1
6b
() s
()
= qC + 1
2()
C if s <  ()
3
2
qC if s   ()
;
the output in the Greek market as
T =
6
5
C ;
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and the internal transfer prices as
tT =  1
5
  
3 ()
s+
8
15
 ;
where  () = 5
2
(1 )

(the gray curve in Figure 2 is the graph of ).
Thus, the outputs in the Latin market and the Greek market are above the out-
put at the Cournot equilibrium. On the one hand, parents reduce their internal
transfer prices below marginal cost in order to take advantage in the external mar-
ket, creating a short of prisonersdilemma. On the another hand, parents increase
their output (i.e., reducing the market price in the home market) in order to increase
their subsidiarys rival tax liability without a¤ecting the marginal cost of their own
subsidiaries.
We have
@qT
@
=   1
62 ()
< 0;
and
@T
@b
= 0;
Thus, the output in the Latin market decreases with . Parents respond to an
increase of the size of the Greek market (i.e., as  becomes small) with an increase
of the output in the Latin market, thus reducing the Latin market price, in order to
raise the tax liability of its rivals subsidiary without a¤ecting the marginal cost of
its own subsidiary. The output in the Greek market is independent of the size b.
We have
@qT
@
=
1
15 (1  )2 > 0;
and
@T
@
= 0:
The output in the Latin market increases with  . The higher tax rates are, the
larger output in the Latin market is. Parents respond to an increase of tax with an
increase of the output in the Latin market, thus reducing the Latin market price, in
order to raise the tax liability of its rivals subsidiary without a¤ecting the marginal
cost of its own subsidiary. The output in the Greek market is independent of the size
 .
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Let us study the total prot and total surplus under two sets of books.
Firms prots in the Latin and Greek markets can be calculated using (1) and (4)
as
TL =
(
CL   45 s+()() if s <  ()
0 if s   ()
;
and TG =
18
25
CG, respectively. Therefore, total prots are
T = TL +
T
G = 
C
L  

45
s+  ()
 ()
+
18
25
CG if s <  () ; (15)
and
T = TL +
T
G =
18
25
CG if s   () : (16)
The surplus in the Latin and Greek markets can be calculated using (6) and (7)
as
STL =
8<: 98SCL   118b

() s
()
2
= SCL +
1
18
2() s
()2
if s <  ()
9
8
SCL if s   ()
;
and STG =
27
25
SCG , respectively. Therefore, total surplus is
ST = STL + S
T
G =
9
8
SCL +
27
25
SCG  
1
18b

 ()  s
 ()
2
if s <  () ; (17)
and
ST = STL + S
T
G =
9
8
SCL +
27
25
SCG if s   () : (18)
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If both rms use two sets of books and  = 0, then in a SPE:
(2.1) The output in the Greek market is
T =
6
5
C ;
and the output in the Latin market is
qT =
(
3
2
qC   1
6b
() s
()
= qC + 1
2()
C if s <  ()
3
2
qC if s   ()
:
Moreover, qT increases with  and converges to the e¢ cient outcome as  becomes
large.
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(2.2) The total prots are below total prots at the Cournot equilibrium.
(2.3) The total surplus is above the total surplus at the Cournot equilibrium.
In summary, keeping two sets of books adhering to the ALP generates a subtle link
between markets that may intensify competition in both markets. On the one hand,
each parent attempts to make the subsidiary a lower cost competitor, in order to
gain a competitive advantage in the external market, by reducing its internal transfer
price. On the another hand, each parent attempts to increase the tax liability of its
subsidiarys rival, in order to gain a competitive advantage in the external market,
by reducing Latin market price (i.e. increasing its production). Therefore, using two
sets of books opens the possibility to gain a competitive advantage in the external
market by reducing own costs and increasing rivals one.
In the absence of the ALP, parents have also an incentive to employ below cost
transfer prices in order to compel their subsidiaries to be more aggressive in the
external market. However incentives in the home market are unchanged and the
equilibrium outcome is just the Cournot outcome -see Lemus and Moreno (2011).
Therefore, if both rms keep two sets of books together with a transfer pricing regu-
lation consistent with the ALP competition intensies in the external market relative
to the equilibrium where both rms using transfer prices for tax purposes not linked
to the external market price.
5 Asymmetric Accounting Policies
In this section we consider the case in which parent rms use asymmetric accounting
policies. We assume that parent 1 uses the market price in the Latin market as the
transfer price per intrarm transaction, i.e., it keeps only one set of books to satisfy
both cost and tax accounting requirements, while parent 2 uses two sets of books.
Subsidiaries observe the price in the Latin market and the internal transfer policy
before competing in quantities. We identify the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE
henceforth) of the game. In this set up, parents act as leaders anticipating the
reactions of the subsidiary rms. We assume throughout this section that  = 0
(i.e., equal tax rates between markets).
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Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p 2 R+, subsidiary 1 chooses its
output 1 to solve
max
12R+
(1  ) (d (1 + 2)  p)1:
Subsidiary 2, knowing the internal transfer price used by its parent t2 2 R chooses
its output 2 to solve
max
22R+
 
d (1 + 2)  t2

2   (d (1 + 2)  p)2:
Thus, the reaction functions of subsidiaries 1 and 2 are
R1 (2; p) = max

1  p
2
  1
2
2; 0

;
and
R2 (1; p; t2) = max

1  p
2
+
p  t2
2 (1  )  
1
2
1; 0

;
respectively.
An equilibrium of the Greek market is a prole of the subsidiaries outputs
(1(p; t2); 2(p; t2)) satisfying the system of equations
1 = R

1 (2; p) ;
2 = R

2 (1; p; t2) :
Solving this system we get
1(p; t2) =
8>><>>:
0 if t2 < p  (1  ) (1  p) ;
(1 )(1 p) (p t2)
3(1 ) if p  (1  ) (1  p) < t2 < p+ (1 )(1 p)2 ;
1 p
2
if t2 > p+
(1 )(1 p)
2
;
(19)
and
2(p; t2) =
8>><>>:
1 p
2
+ p t2
2(1 ) if t2 < p  (1  ) (1  p) ;
(1 )(1 p)+2(p t2)
3(1 ) if p  (1  ) (1  p) < t2 < p+ (1 )(1 p)2 ;
0 if t2 > p+
(1 )(1 p)
2
:
(20)
Note that in the game played by subsidiaries equilibrium is unique.
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A SPE of the game is prole of actions for parents 1 and 2, (q1; q

2; t

2), and a pair of
functions describing the subsidiaries strategies (f 1 (q1; q2; t2); f

2 (q1; q2; t2)) such that
parents maximize consolidated prots and subsidiaries maximize their own prots. As
discussed above, the subsidiaries game has a unique equilibrium. Then in a SPE the
subsidiaries strategies are f i (q1; q2; t2) = i(p
d(q1; q2); t2) for i 2 f1; 2g, and parents,
anticipating that subsidiaries reactions are described by (1; 2), choose their actions
in order to maximize consolidated prots
 
i

. Thus, Parent 1 chooses q1 to solve
max
q12R+
1(q1; q2; t2);
where
1(q1; q2; t2) = 1(q1; q2; 1
 
pd(q1 + q2); t2

; 2
 
pd(q1 + q2)

; t2):
Denote by Rq1 (t2; q2) the reaction function of Parent 1, i.e., the solution to Parent 1s
prot maximization problem.
Likewise, Parent 2 chooses its output q2 and its internal transfer price t2 in order
to solve
max
(t2;q2)2RR+
2(q1; q2; t2);
where
2(q1; q2; t2) = 2(q1; q2; 1
 
pd(q1 + q2); t2

; 2
 
pd(q1 + q2)

; t2):
Denote by (Rq2 (q1) ; R
t
2 (q1)) the reaction functions of Parent 2, i.e., the solution to
Parent 2s prot maximization problem.
Hence in a SPE of the game the prole of parentsactions, (q1; q

2; t

2), satisfy the
system
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; q

2) ;
q2 = R
q
2 (q

1) ;
t2 = R
t
2 (q

1) :
In an interior SPE, i.e., such that the outputs of parent and subsidiaries are
positive, the subsidiaries outputs are
1 = 1
 
pd(q1 + q

2); t

2

=
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)  (pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) > 0;
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and
2 = 2
 
pd(q1 + q

2); t

2

=
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)+ 2(pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) > 0:
Using these formulae we can solve the system of equations formed by parents 1 and
2 reaction functions to obtain
q1 =
(1  2) s2 + 2 (5  4) s+ 12 (1  )
2b ((1  2) s+ 18 (1  )) ;
q2 =  
(1  2) s2 + 2 (5  4) s  12 (1  )
2b ((1  2) s+ 18 (1  )) ;
t2 =  
(1  2) ((1  3) s+ 12 (1  ))
2 ((1  2) s+ 18 (1  )) :
We calculate the equilibrium price in the Latin market,
pd(q1 + q

2) =
(1  2) s+ 6 (1  )
(1  2) s+ 18 (1  ) :
Substituting the values t2 and p
d(q1 + q

2) in the equations for 

1 and 

2 above we
obtain the subsidiariesoutputs,
1 =  
1
2
(1  2) s
(1  2) s+ 18 (1  ) ;
2 =
1

(1  2) s+ 12 (1  )
(1  2) s+ 18 (1  ) :
For tax rates  2 [0; 1=2), the equation above yields 1 < 0, and therefore an interior
SPE does not exist.
Proposition 3. Assume that parent rms use asymmetric accounting policies and
 = 0. If  2 [0; 1=2), then an interior SPE does not exist.
Since in almost all countries tax rates are below one half, we turn to studying
the (corner) SPE that arise for  2 [0; 1=2).15 Let us be given a SPE. Note that
a SPE is identied by (q1; q

2; t

2), since subsidiaries outputs are given by (

1; 

2) =
15Auerbach et al (2008) present evidence on trends in corporation tax revenues and the industrial
composition of revenues for the G7 countries (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan,
United States and Canada) over the period 1979 to 2006. They show that statutory corporation tax
rates have been falling across the G7 economies and provide some evidence of convergence to main
rates between 30% to 40%.
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 
1
 
pd(q1 + q

2); t

2

; 2
 
pd(q1 + q

2); t

2

in the equations (19) and (20). We establish
some properties of SPE.
Claim 1. If 2 > 0, then t

2 < p
 and t2 2 ( 
1
2
;
1
4
).
Proof. Assume that 2 > 0. If 

1 > 0, then the rst-order condition for Parent
2s prot maximization yields
t2 = R
t
2 (q

1; q

2) =  
1   + (1  5) pd(q1 + q2)
4
:
Since p = pd(q1 + q

2)  0, then
t2   p =  
1   + (1  5) p
4
  p
=  1  
4
(1 + 5p) < 0:
Moreover, since t2 increases with  and p
 2 (0; 1), then t2 2 ( 
1
2
;
1
4
).
If 1 = 0, then the rst-order condition for Parent 2s prot maximization yields
t2 = R
t
2 (q

1; q

2) =  pd(q1 + q2):
Since p = pd(q1 + q

2)  0, then
t2   p =   (1  ) p < 0:
Moreover, since p 2 (0; 1) and  2 [0; 1=2), then t2 2 ( 
1
2
,0). 
Claim 2. If q2 = 0, then q

1 > 0.
Proof. Assume q2 = 0. If t

2 < p
d(q1 + q

2)   (1  )
 
1  pd(q1 + q2)

, then
1 = 0 and the rst-order condition for Parent 1s prot maximization yields
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; 0) = q
M > 0:
If pd(q1 + q

2)   (1  )
 
1  pd(q1 + q2)

< t2 < p
d(q1 + q

2) +
(1 )(1 pd(q1+q2))
2
, then
1,

2 > 0 and the rst-order condition for Parent 1s prot maximization yields
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; 0) =
1
2b
9 (1  )2 + (5 (1  2) + 3 2) s+ (1 + ) st2
n( ; s)
;
where n( ; s) := 9 (1  )2 + (1  2) (2  ) s. Note that n( ; s) > 0 on [0; 1=2).
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Since  < 1=2 by assumption, and t2 >  
1
2
by Claim 1, we have
q1 >
1
2b
9 (1  )2 + (5 (1  2) + 3 2) s+ (1 + ) s( 1
2
)
n( ; s)
=
1
2b
9 (1  )2 + 3s
2
(1  2) (3  )
n( ; s)
> 0:
Finally, if t2 > p
d(q1+q

2)+
(1 )(1 pd(q1+q2))
2
, then 2 = 0 and the rst-order condition
for Parent 1s prot maximization yields
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; 0) =
1
b
s+ 2
s+ 4
> 0: 
Claim 3. q1 > 0.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that q1 = 0. If t

2 < p
d(q1 + q

2)  
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2), then 1 = 0, and therefore
2 =
1  pd(q1 + q2)
2
+
pd(q1 + q

2)  t2
2 (1  ) ;
by equation (20). Since q2 > 0 by Claim 2, then the rst-order conditions for Parent
2s prot maximization are
q2 =
1
b
2 (1  )2 +  2s
 2s+ 4 (1  )2  
1


 2s+ 4 (1  )2 t

2;
t2 =  (1  bq2) :
Solving this system of equations we get (q2; t

2; 

2) = (q
M ,
2
,M). However,
q1 = R
q
1

2
; qM

=
qM
2
> 0;
contradicting that q1 = 0.
If pd(q1 + q

2)   (1  )
 
1  pd(q1 + q2)

< t2 < p
d(q1 + q

2) +
(1 )(1 pd(q1+q2))
2
,
then 1,

2 > 0, and therefore
1 =
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)  (pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) ;
2 =
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)+ 2(pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) :
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by equations (19) and (20). Since q2 > 0 by Claim 2, then the rst-order conditions
for Parent 2s prot maximization are
q2 =
1
2b
s (5 (1  2) + 3 2   3 (3  5)) + 9 (1  )2
g ( ; s)
+
1
2
1  5
g ( ; s)
t2;
t2 =  
1  3
2
+
b
4
(1  5) q2;
where g ( ; s) := 9 (1  )2   (1  2) (1 + ) s.
Solving this system of equations we get
(q2; t

2; 

1; 

2) =

2
b
2  s
8  s;
 (7 + s)  3
8  s ; 
1 + s
 (8  s) ;
6
 (8  s)

:
Hence either 1 < 0 or 

2 < 0, and therefore such a prole cannot be an SPE.
If t2 > p
d(q1 + q

2) +
(1 )(1 pd(q1+q2))
2
, then 2 = 0, and therefore
1 =
1  pd(q1 + q2)
2
;
by equation (19). Since q2 > 0 by Claim 2, then the rst-order condition for Parent
2s prot maximization yields
q2 = q
M :
However,
q1 = R
q
1
 
qM

=
1
2b
s+ 2
s+ 4
> 0;
contradicting that q1 = 0. 
Claim 4. 1 > 0.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that 1 = 0. Then
2 =
1  pd(q1 + q2)
2
+
pd(q1 + q

2)  t2
2 (1  ) > 0;
by equation (20). Since q1 > 0 by Claim 3, the rst-order condition for Parent 1s
prot maximization yields
q1 =
1  bq2
2b
;
and the rst-order conditions for Parent 2s prot maximization yield the system
q2 = max
 
0;
1
b
2 (1  )2 +  2s
 2s+ 4 (1  )2  
1


 2s+ 4 (1  )2 t

2  
2 (1  )2 +  2s
 2s+ 4 (1  )2 q

1
!
;
t2 =  (1  b (q1 + q2)) :
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Solving this system of equations we get (q1; q

2; t

2) =
 
qC ; qC ; 
3

. Substituting these
values in equation (19) yields
1 = 1

pd(2qC);

3

=
1
12
> 0;
contradicting that 1 = 0. 
Claim 5. 2 > 0.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that 2 = 0. Then
1 =
1  pd(q1 + q2)
2
> 0;
by equation (19). Since q1 > 0 by Claim 3, the rst-order condition for prot maxi-
mization of parents 1 and 2 yield the system
q1 =
1
b
s+ 2
s+ 4
  s+ 2
s+ 4
q2;
q2 = max

0;
1
2b
(1  bq1)

:
Solving this system of equations we get
(q1; q

2) =

s+ 2
b (s+ 6)
;
2
b (s+ 6)

:
In a SPE, the level of output q2 = 2=b (s+ 6) > 0 must maximize Parent 2s prot
taking as given q1 =
s+2
b(s+6)
and the subsidiaries reactions (1; 2). Then q

2 solves the
system given by the rst-order conditions for Parent 2s prot maximization
q2 =
1
2b
2s (13   5 (2   2)) + 36 (1  )2   s2 (1  ) (2  )
(s+ 6) g ( ; s)
+
1
2
1  5
g ( ; s)
t2;
t2 =  
1
4
2 (5  13) + s (1  )
s+ 6
+
b
4
(1  5) q2:
The solution to this system is
q^2 =
s (s+ 10)  16
b (s  8) (s+ 6) :
For s > 0, q^2 6= 2=b (s+ 6), which leads to a contradiction. Hence 2 > 0. 
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With these results in hand, we can now identify the parameter values of  and
s = b= for which a pure strategy SPE exists, and identify the equilibrium outputs
and prots. Dene l() := 3 (1  ) = (2  ), and h() := 12 (1  ) = (1 + ). The
functions l and h are both decreasing, and l() < h() on [0; 1] in Figure 1 the
thin (resp. thick) curve is the graph of l (resp. h). Also write r( ; s) := (5  7) s+
24 (1  ). Note that r( ; s) > 0 on [0; 1=2).
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
tau
s
Figure 1: the Functions l and h:
Proposition 4: Assume that  < 1=2 and  = 0. If Parent 1 uses one set of books
and Parent 2 uses two sets of books, then a unique (pure strategy) SPE exist whenever
l() < s < 8, whereas no (pure strategy) SPE exists otherwise. Moreover:
(4.1) If l() < s < minfh(); 8g, then the outputs of parents and subsidiaries in the
unique SPE are
(q1; q

2) =

2qC +
4 (2  )
3b
s  l()
r( ; s)
; 0

;
and
(1; 

2) =

3
4

C   (1 + )

h()  s
r( ; s)

;
3
2

C +
(1 + )
3
h()  s
r( ; s)

;
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and parentsprots are
1 =
9
16
CG  
(1   2) ((7  17) s2   12 (1  ) (s+ 16))
16b
h()  s
r( ; s)2
;
2 =
9
8
CG +
3 (1   2) ((3  5) s+ 20 (1  ))
8
h()  s
r( ; s)2
:
(4.2) If h()  s < 8, then the outputs of parents and subsidiaries are
(q1; q

2; 

1; 

2) =

3qC ; 0;
3
4
C ;
3
2
C

;
and the parentsprots are
(1;

2) =

9
16
CG;
9
8
CG

:
Proof. Since q1,

1,

2 > 0, by claims 3, 4 and 5, and since by Proposition 3 there
is no SPE such that these inequalities and q2 > 0 hold, then in a (pure strategy)
SPE, when it exists, we have q2 = 0. Since 

1,

2 > 0 by claims 4 and 5, then
1 =
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)  (pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) ;
2 =
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)+ 2(pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) ;
by equations (19) and (20). Since q1 > 0 by Claim 2 and q

2 = 0, the rst-order
condition for Parent 1s prot maximization yields
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; 0) =
1
2b
s (5 (1  2) + 3 2) + 9 (1  )2
n( ; s)
+
1
2
1 + 
n( ; s)
t2;
and the rst-order condition for Parent 2s prot maximization yields
t2 = R
t
2 (q

1; 0) =  
1  3
2
+
b
4
(1  5) q1:
Solving this system of equations we get
q1 =
1
b
  (1 + )
b
h()  s
r( ; s)
;
t2 =  
1  
4
  1 + 
4
h()  s
r( ; s)
(1  5) ;
1 =
(2  )

s  l()
r( ; s)
and
2 =
2

(1  2) s+ 9 (1  )
r( ; s)
:
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(These values for q1, 

1 and 

2 can be readily rewritten using the formulae given in
(4:1) of Proposition 4.) Thus, 1  0 whenever s  l(). Since in equilibrium 1 > 0
by Claim 5, then a SPE does not exist when s  l(). Assume that l() < s. The
equilibrium prices in the Latin is
p = pd(q1) =
h ()  s
(1 + ) r( ; s)
:
Thus, in order for p > 0 we must have s < h(). Assume that h() > s. The
equilibrium price in the Greek markets is
 = d(1 + 

2) =
(1  2) s+ 9 (1  )
r( ; s)
> 0:
In order to verify that the prole identied is SPE we need to show that the level
of output q2 = 0 maximizes Parent 2s prots taking q

1 as given. The system given
by the rst-order conditions for Parent 2s prot maximization is
q2 =
1
2b
3 (1  )  36 (1  )2   s (27   (32 + 11)) + s2  29
3
    8s2
g ( ; s) r( ; s)
+
1
2
1  5
g ( ; s)
t2;
t2 =  
s (1   (2  3)) + 3 (3  7) (1  )
r( ; s)
+
b
4
(1  5) q2:
Solving this system we get
q2 =
1
b
4s (s+ 10)  8s (s+ 4)  48 (1  )
(s  8) r( ; s) :
In order for q2  0 we must have
() :=
p
37  4 (19  10)  5 + 4
1  2  s  8:
Since s > l() > () on [0; 1=2), for q2  0 we must have s < 8. In summary,
the prole of parents and subsidiaries outputs as well as the transfer price of parent
2 identied above forms a SPE when l() < s < h() and s < 8, i.e., l() < s <
minfh(); 8g. Thus, when this is the case there is a unique SPE and it is given by
the formulae given in (4:1) of Proposition 4.
Now suppose that s  h(). Then in equilibrium p = 0, and therefore q1  1b .
Then the rst-order condition for Parent 2s prot maximization yields
t2 = R
t
2

1
b
; 0

=  1  
4
;
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and therefore,
(1; 

2) = (
3
4
C ;
3
2
C);
by equations (19) and (20). The equilibrium price in the Greek markets is
 = d(1 + 

2) =
3
4
C :
In order for q2 = 0 to maximize the prots of Parent 2 taking as given q

1 =
1
b
, the
solution to the system dened the rst-order conditions,
q2 =  
1  
2
2  
g ( ; s)
+
1
2
1  5
g ( ; s)
t2;
t2 =  
1  
4
+
b
4
(1  5) q2:
Solving this system of equations we get
~q2 =
1

1
s  8 :
For ~q2  0 we must also have s < 8. Hence the prole of outputs and transfer
price dene above forms a SPE when h() < s < 8.
Finally, if s  l(), then 1  0, and since in equilibrium 1 > 0 by Claim 5, then
a SPE does not exist. And if s  8, then whether s < h(), or s  h() neither of
the two candidate equilibria identied are SPE, and therefore a pure strategy SPE
does not exist either.
The parents equilibrium prots for the cases l() < s < minfh(); 8g and h() <
s < 8 are readily obtained simply by substituting parents and subsidiaries outputs in
the formulae of the consolidated prots. 
In an equilibrium in which parents use asymmetric accounting policies, the parent
that uses one set of books, say Parent 1, has an incentive to increase its output in
order to alleviate double marginalization (i.e., to decrease the cost of its subsidiary),
whereas the parent that uses two sets of books, Parent 2, decreases its output all
the way to zero in order to increase the cost of its subsidiarys rival. Thus Parent 1
becomes the dominant producer in the home market. Since t2 < p
 by claims 1 and
5, Subsidiary 2 becomes the dominant producer in the external market. Equilibrium
prots of Parent 2 uses two sets of books dominate equilibrium prots of Parent 1
uses one set of books (i.e., 2 > 

1, see Appendix 3).
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Assume that l() < s < minfh(); 8g. Then the total output in the Latin market
satises
q1 + q

2 = q

1 = 2q
C +
4 (2  )
3b
s  l()
r( ; s)
> 2qC ;
and the total output in the Greek market satises
1 + 

2 = 2
C +
2  
3
s  l()
r( ; s)
> 2C :
Hence the surplus in both markets is above the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium,
i.e., SL > S
C
L and S

G > S
C
G . Since S
C
L > S
O
L and S
C
G > S
O
G by Proposition 1, the
surplus in both markets is above under one set of books. In the Appendix 4 we show
that SL + S

G < S
T and therefore, the total surplus is below under two sets of books.
We have
@q1
@
=  12 (1  )
2r( ; s)2
(7  5) < 0;
and
@ (1 + 

2)
@b
=
3 (1  )
2r( ; s)2
(7  5) > 0:
Thus, the output in the Latin (Greek) market decreases (increases) with  (b). Parent
1 responds to an increase of the size of the Greek market (i.e., a smaller value of )
with an increase of the output in the Latin market, thus reducing the Latin market
price (in order to alleviate the double marginalization problem) and avoiding a large
reduction of the sales of its subsidiary. The market share of subsidiary 2 increases with
the size of the Latin since its output decreases with b. Subsidiary 1 is more (less)
aggressive competitor in the Greek market as the prots in Latin market become
negligible (large).
Also we have
@q1
@
= 12
s+ 2
r( ; s)2
> 0;
and
@ (1 + 

2)
@
= 3s
s+ 2
r( ; s)2
> 0:
The output in the Latin market of parent 1 increases with  . The higher tax rates are,
the larger output in the Latin market of parent 1 is. This occurs because a larger Latin
market output (to compensate for q2 = 0) tends to reduce the di¤erence between the
tax bill paid at the Latin and the Greek markets. The output of subsidiary 1 (2)
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increases (decreases) with  . Parent 1 responds to an increase of tax with an increase
of the output in the Latin market, thus reducing the Latin market price. A decrease
in the Latin market price encourages the subsidiary 1 to behave more aggressively by
expanding its output in the Greek market and thus causes subsidiary 2 to become
less aggressive by reducing its outcome.
If h() < s < 8, then
q1 + q

2 = q

1 = 3q
C > 2qC ;
and
1 + 

2 =
9
4
C > 2C :
Hence the surplus in both markets is above the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium,
i.e., SL > S
C
L and S

G > S
C
G . Since S
C
L > S
O
L and S
C
G > S
O
G by Proposition 1, the
surplus in both markets is above under one set of books. In the Appendix 4 we show
that SL + S

G < S
T and therefore, the total surplus is below under two sets of books.
Of course, our results would be symmetric if Parent 1 uses two sets of books
and Parent 2 uses one set of books. Henceforth we use the superscripts OT and
O T to refer to the outputs and prots of the rm using one and two sets of books,
respectively, in a situation where parents use asymmetric accounting policies; i.e.,
q
OT = q1, 
OT = 1 and 
O T = 1, whereas q
O T = q2, 
O T = 2 and 
O T = 2,
where the star values are those given in Proposition 4 above.
6 Endogenizing the Choice of Accounting Policies
We now turn to study parents choice of accounting policies. We assume that parents
can commit to keeping either one set of books or two sets of books. This assumption
is reasonable if, for example, the costs associated with changing the accounting policy
are prohibitively high.16 By choosing to keep one set of books, a parent commits to
using the Latin market price as the transfer price per intrarm transaction, regardless
of its competitor actions. Likewise, by choosing to keep two sets of books, a parent
16Göx (2000) notes that a new accounting policy usually requires substantial investments in de-
veloping or acquiring software and in training employees and/or hiring consultants.
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commits to using an internal transfer price to allocate costs, whatever action of its
competitor.
In section 3, we identied the parentsprots when both parents choose one set
of books, O and in section 4, we identied the parentsprots when both parents
choose two sets of books, T . Likewise, in section 5 we identied the prots in a
(pure strategy) SPE when parents choose asymmetric accounting policies, OT and
OT , where the superscripts OT and O T refer to the parent using one and two sets of
books, respectively. Thus, at the stage of choosing their accounting policies parents,
assuming that following their decisions a (pure strategy) SPE follows, parentspayo¤s
are described by the following matrix:
O2 T2
O1 
O;O 
OT ;O
T
T1 
O T ;
OT T ;T
Table 1: ParentsChoice of Accounting Policies.
We study the equilibria of this game. Recall from proposition 2 the function
dening T di¤er in the space ( ; s) depending on the sign of the inequality s R  ().
Likewise, from proposition 4 the functions dening OT and OT di¤er in the space
( ; s) depending on the sign of the inequality s R h (). In Appendix 5 we study
the sing of T    OT , which is the prot gain or loss to a parent that deviates to
choosing one set of books from a situation where both parents choose two sets of
books. In Appendix 6 we study the sign of O  O T , which is the prot gain or loss
to a parent that deviates to choosing two sets of books from a situation where both
parents choose one set of books.
On the parameter space ( ; s) parentsprots congure the game described in
Table 1 as a prisonersdilemma (with a unique Pareto ine¢ cient Nash equilibrium
in which both parents choose two sets of books), a game of chicken (with one parent
choosing one set of books and other parent choosing two sets of books), a coordination
game (in which both parents choose two sets of books or both parents choose one
set of books), or even to a cooperation game with a unique Pareto e¢ cient Nash
equilibrium (in which both parents choose one set of books).
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In Appendixes 3 and 4 we show that T >  OT and O > O T whenever
min f () ; h ()g < s < 8. In this region, characterized by relatively high tax rates
( > 1
5
) and a large value of the size of the Greek market relative to that of the
Latin (s > 5
2
), the game in Table 1 is a Coordination Game (CO) that has two pure
strategy Nash equilibria, one in which both parents choose two sets of books, and
another one in which choose one set of books.
When s < min f () ; h ()g identifying the signs of T    OT and O   O T is
cumbersome. We show that if l() < s < 1:385, then T < OT . If 1:385 < s <
min f () ; h ()g and the tax rates are not too high, then T >  OT (see Figure 3
in Appendix 5). We also show that if 1.23 < s < 2.26, then O < O T . If l() < s <
1.23 or 2.26 < s < min f () ; h ()g, there is a critical value e such that O Q O T
whenever  Q e (see Figure 4 in Appendix 6). These results allow to identify the
possible types of the game that Table 1 may give rise depending of the values of s
and  :
(i) If l() < s < 1.23, then T <  OT , and Table 1 describes either a Game of
Chicken (CH) (when O < OT ) or a Cooperation Game (CP) (when O > OT )
depending on whether the value of  is high or very high, respectively. In a CH game
there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, in these equilibria one rm uses one set
of books and the other uses two sets of books. In a CP game it is a dominant strategy
for both rms to use one set of books.
(ii) If 1.23 < s < 1:385, then O < O T and T <  OT , and hence Table 1
describes a CH game.
(iii) If 1:385 < s < 2.26, then O < O T , and the game in Table 1 is either a
PrisonersDilemma game (PD) (when T >  OT ) or a CH game (when T <  OT ),
depending on whether  is low or high, respectively. In a PD game keeping two sets
of books is the unique equilibrium (and is in dominant strategies).
(iv) If 2.26 < s < min f () ; h ()g, then there are parameter constellations such
that T 7  OT and/or O 7 O T . In this case, all four types of games (PD, CO,
CH and CP) may emerge as the tax rate  increases from low, to intermediate, to
high values.
In Figure 2 below, the gray curve is the graph of the function , the thin curve
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Figure 1: Figure 2: Nature of the Game in Table 1.
is the graph of the function l and thick curve is the graphs of the function h. The
gure indicate the regions of parameters for which the game of Table 1 is a member
of the di¤erent classes in the taxonomy described above. A PD game arises for low
tax rates if s > 1:385. For high tax rates (i.e., for value of  near 1
2
) a CP game
arises when the Latin market is not too small relative to the Greek market (i.e., when
s is near 1), and a CO arises when the Latin market is signicantly smaller than the
Greek market. For intermediate tax rates CH game arises when the Latin market is
not too small relative to the Greek market, and a CO arises when the Latin market
is signicantly smaller than the Greek market.
We summarize these results in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5: Assume that  < 1=2 and  = 0. Depending on the values of  and
s the game facing parents when they choose their accounting policies may be a Coor-
dination Game, a Cooperation Game, a Game of Chicken or a PrisonersDilemma
Game. In particular for most of the size di¤erence between markets, when the tax
rates are high, there is an equilibrium in which parents keep one set of books (this
equilibrium is unique when the both markets are similar in size) and when tax rates
are low, keeping two sets of books is the unique equilibrium. Asymmetric accounting
policies, where one parent keeps one set of books and the other keeps two sets of books,
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may be sustained in equilibrium when the size of the Latin market is not too small
relative to that of the Greek market.
Propositions 5 provides a rationale for the mixed empirical evidence on the use
of alternative accounting system. Also it identies the parameter constellations for
which there are strategic incentives for maintaining one set of books, i.e., for using
the same transfer prices for tax reporting and for managerial purposes. Since keeping
one set of books provides parents with an instrument to soften competition in the
Greek market, our analysis provides a convincing explanation of how the choice of
the accounting policy can serve as a precommitment device. In our setting, the
regulatory constraint (i.e., transfer prices for tax purposes must be consistent with
the ALP) introduces possibilities for tacit coordination, and provides a rationale for
why parents delegate quantity decisions to subsidiaries.
7 Summary and Discussion
The OECD recommendation that transfer prices between parent rms and their sub-
sidiaries be consistent with ALP for tax purposes does not restrict internal pricing
policies. Since transfer prices serve both to allocate costs to subsidiaries and to de-
termine tax liability in the jurisdictions where rms operate, the incentive and tax
transfer prices would be di¤erent. When rms use the same transfer price (and hence,
a transfer price consistent with the ALP) for tax reporting and for providing incen-
tives, it is said that they keep one set of books, and when rms use di¤erent transfer
prices for each purpose, it is said that they keep two sets of books. Thus, in practice,
the adoption of ALP commits the rms to the adoption of one of these accounting
policies.
In a context of imperfectly competitive markets where rms are vertical separated,
we nd that accounting policies determine the properties of market outcomes: if
parents keep one set of books, competition in the external (home) market softens
(intensies) relative to the equilibrium where parents and subsidiaries are integrated.
In contrast, if rms keep two sets of books or keep asymmetric accounting policies
(i.e., one parent choosing one set of books and other parent choosing two sets of
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books), competition intensies in both markets.
In this paper we show that the choice between one and two sets of books may
serve as a precommitment device. When parents choose their accounting policies
there exists a wide variety of game forms for alternative parameter depending on the
di¤erences in the market size and tax rates. The possible types of the game varies
from a prisonersdilemma (with a unique Pareto ine¢ cient Nash equilibrium in which
both parents choose two sets of books) to a game of chicken (with one parent choosing
one set of books and other parent choosing two sets of books ) or a coordination game
(in which both parents choose two sets of books or both parents choose one set of
books). Also, parameter constellations of market sizes and tax rates can be found
such the type of game is a cooperation game (with a unique Pareto e¢ cient Nash
equilibrium in which both parents choose one set of books).
This result provides a possible explanation for the mixed empirical evidence on
the use of alternative accounting system. Particularly, the choice of a Pareto superior
strategy (i.e., one set of books) can be supported as an equilibrium action under
broad conditions. Specically, for most of the size di¤erence between markets, when
the tax rates are high, there is an equilibrium in which parents keep one set of
books. Interestingly, the prospect to tacit coordination may contribute to a better
understanding of why rms decentralize. Therefore, vertical separation of parent and
subsidiary rms, whose motivation is not well understood in the absence of frictions
when quantities are strategic substitutes, may be justied if rms keep one set of
books.
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Appendix 1
If  < 1
2
, then @q
T
@
< 0 for all s.
Proof. We have
@qT
@
=   (1  )
 (15 (1  ) (  (1  )) + 2s(  ))2	;
where
	 = 5 (3  7) + 10  (  2 (1  )) + 2 2+ 2s (  )2 :
Write  (; s) and  (; s) for the value  that solves 	 = 0 given  and s. We omit
the expressions of  (; s) and  (; s) because of its length. Then we have 	 > 0,
whenever  (; s) <  <  (; s) and 	 < 0, otherwise. Since  = 1
2
is the minimum
value of  (; s) which is yield when  = 1
2
for all s, then  < 1
2
implies  <  (; s),
and therefore 	 > 0: Thus if  < 1
2
, then 	 > 0 and therefore @q
T
@
< 0 for all s. 
Appendix 2
If  is su¢ ciently low, there is a critical value s such that @
T
@
Q 0 whenever s R s.
Proof. We have
@T
@
=
2 (1  )
 (2s(  )  15 (1  ) (1  ( +)))2	;
where
	 = 15 (1  )2   2s  22   3 (1  ) (2  ) :
Write  (; s) for the value of  that solve 	 = 0 given  and s. We omit
the expression of  (; s) because of its length. Then we have 	 R 0, and therefore
@T
@
R 0, whenever  Q  (; s). In the limit, as s approaches zero,  = 1 for all 
and as s approaches innity,  = 0 if  = 0. Note that  2 (0; 1) and  decreases
with s for all . Since lims!0  (; s) = 1 and lims!1  (0; s) = 0, then  decreases
with s for all  implies there is a critical value s such that  Q  (0) whenever s R s;
and therefore 	 Q 0. Thus we have 	 Q 0, and therefore @T
@
Q 0, whenever s R s.

Appendix 3
If l() < s < 8, then 2   1 > 0.
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0 and l() < s < 8. If s < h(), we calculate the
di¤erence of prots between parent 2 and parent 1 at equilibrium described in (4:1)
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of Proposition 4 as
2 1 =
3 (1  )
br( ; s)2
 
s (1  ) (43  35 + 3s (3  7))  s3 (1  2)  48 (1  )2 :
We omit the expression of () and () for the values of s that solves 2   1 = 0
for  < 1
2
because of its length. We have 2   1 > 0 whenever () < s < ().
Since () < l() < s < minfh(); 8g < (), then 2   1 > 0. If s > h(),
we calculate the di¤erence of prots between parent 2 and parent 1 at equilibrium
described in (4:2) of Proposition 4 as 2 1 = 916CG > 0. Therefore if l() < s < 8,
then whether s < h(), or s  h(), 2   1 > 0. 
Appendix 4
Let us study the total surplus in a situation where parents use asymmetric accounting
policies in term of the total surplus when both rms use two sets of books:
If h()  s < 8 and  () < s, then SL + SG < ST .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0, h()  s < 8 and  () < s. Using equations (6)
and (18) we calculate the total surplus at equilibrium described in (4:2) of Proposition
4 as
SL + S

G = S
T   9
800
;
and therefore
SL + S

G < S
T :
If  () > s > h(), then SL + S

G < S
T .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0 and  () > s > h(). Using equations (6) and
(17) we calculate the total surplus at equilibrium described in (4:2) of Proposition 4
as
SL + S

G = S
T +
S
7200b (1  )2 ;
where
S = 64s2 2 + 400 (1  )2   s (239 + 81) (1  ) :
We omit the expression of ! () for the value of s that solves S = 0 given  because
of its length. Then we have S R 0, and therefore SOT R ST , whenever s R ! ().
Since
! ()   () < 0;
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for all  , then ! ()   () < 0 implies
s < ! () ;
and therefore
SL + S

G < S
T :
If  () < s < h() and s < 8, then SL + S

G < S
T .
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0,  () < s < h() and s < 8. Using
equations (6) and (18) we calculate the total surplus at equilibrium described in (4:1)
of Proposition 4 as
SL + S

G = S
T   S
50br ( ; s)2
;
where
S = s
 
3 (283  683) (1  )  3s2 (10  17) + s (235 +  (589   724))+3600 (1  )2 :
We omit the expression of ! () for the value of s that solves S = 0 given  because
of its length. Then we have S R 0, and therefore SOT R ST , whenever s R ! ().
Since
! ()  h () < 0;
for all  , then ! ()  h () < 0 implies
s < ! () ;
and therefore
SL + S

G < S
T :
If s < h (), s <  () and l() < s < 8, then SL + S

G < S
T .
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0, s < h (), s <  () and l() < s < 8.
Using equations (6) and (17) we calculate the total surplus at equilibrium described
in (4:1) of Proposition 4 as
SL + S

G = S
T +
eS
450b (1  )2 r ( ; s)2 ;
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where
eS = 4s4 2 (5  7)2   18 000 (1  )4   s3 (1  ) (230   (1631  1865))
 2s2 (745   (2474   17)) (1  )2   3s (493 + 547) (1  )3 :
Since eS is negative for all s if  = 1
2
, then eS increases with  (recall @qT
@
> 0 and
@T
@
= 0) implies eS is negative in the space ( ; s), and therefore
SL + S

G < S
T :
Appendix 5
Let us study total prots of the rm using one set of books in a situation where
parents use asymmetric accounting policies in term of total prots if both parents
use two sets of books:
If h()  s < 8 and  () < s, then OT < T .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0, h()  s < 8 and  () < s. Using (16), we
calculate rms total prots under one set of books when its competitor keeps two
sets of books described in (4:2) of Proposition 4 as
OT = T   7 (1  )
400
;
and therefore
OT < T :
If  () > s > h(), then OT < T .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0 and  () > s > h(). Using (15), these prots
can be calculated as
OT = T +

3600b (1  ) ;
where  = 32s2 2   s (63  143) (1  )   400 (1  )2. We omit the expression of
 () for the value of s that solves  = 0 given  because of its length. Then we have
 R 0, and therefore OT R T , whenever s R  (). Since
h()   () < 0 and  ()   () < 0;
for all  , then h()   () < 0 and  ()   () < 0 implies
s <  () ;
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and therefore
OT < T :
If  () < s < h() and s < 8, then OT < T .
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0,  () < s < h() and s < 8. Using (16), we
calculate rms total prots under one set of books when its competitor keeps two
sets of books described in (4:1) of Proposition 4 as
OT = T   3 (1  )
25br( ; s)2
;
where
 = (1  )  s (109 + 91) + s2 (85  149)  s3 (5  16)  1200 (1  )2 :
Write 1 () for the value of s that solves  = 0 if  <
5
16
and 2 () for the value of
s that solves  = 0 if  =2  0; 5
16

(i.e., there are two real roots for the value of s that
solves  = 0: one in the interval  2  0; 5
16

and the other  =2  0; 5
16

). We omit the
expressions of 1 () and 2 () for the value of s that solves  = 0 given  because
of its length.
We have  R 0, and therefore OT S T , whenever s R 1 (). Since
 ()  1 () > 0;
for  < 5
16
, then  ()  1 () > 0 implies
s > 1 () ;
and therefore OT < T . We have  R 0, and therefore OT S T , whenever
s R 2 (). Since
 ()  2 () > 0;
for  > 5
16
, then  ()  2 () > 0 implies
s > 2 () ;
and therefore OT < T . Thus whether  2  0; 5
16

, or  =2  0; 5
16

,
2   1 > 0:
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If s < h (), s <  () and l() < s < 8, then OT < T whenever s < 1:385,
whereas OT Q T whenever  Q b and s > 1:385.
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0, s < h (), s <  () and l() < s < 8.
Using (15), these prots can be calculated as
OT = T +
b
225b (1  ) r( ; s)2 ;
where
b =   (1  )2  3s (2981  2941) (1  ) + 4s2  730  2317 + 1444 2
 s3 (1  )  437   5 2   260+ 18 000 (1  )4 + 2s4 2 (5  7)2 :
There is no closed form solutions for the value of s that solves b( ; s) = 0. Figure
3 below are the graphs of the function b for di¤erent values of  . As graphically
displayed by the Figure 3 if  = 1
2
, the values of s must lie between 1 and 5
2
andb is positive for all s and if  = 0, the values of s must lie between 3
2
and 8 andb is negative for all s. Also b increases with  if s > 1:385 and decreases with  ,
otherwise. Therefore for s > 1:385, since b < 0 if  = 0 and b > 0 if  = 1
2
, then b
increases with  implies there is a critical value b such that b Q 0 whenever  Q b .
Then we have b Q 0, and therefore OT Q T , whenever  Q b . For s < 1:385,
since b > 0 for  = 1
2
, then b decreases with  implies b > 0 for all  and therefore
OT > T .
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Figure 3: calculating b for di¤erent values of  and s:
Appendix 6
Let us study the prots of the rm using two sets of books in a situation where
parents use asymmetric accounting policies in term of total prots if both parents
use one set of books:
If h()  s < 8, then OT < T .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0 and h()  s < 8. Using (12), we calculate rms
total prots under two sets of books when its competitor keeps one set of books
described in (4:2) of Proposition 4 as
OT = O   3 (1  )
8b (8s+ 27)2
 
216 + 117s+ 16s2

;
and therefore
OT < O:
If l () < s < h() and s < 8, then OT > O whenever s 2 (1:23; 2:26), whereas
OT Q O whenever  R e and s =2 (1:23; 2:26).
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0, l () < s < h() and s < 8. Using (12), we
calculate rms total prots under two sets of books when its competitor keeps one
set of books described in (4:1) of Proposition 4 as
OT = O +
3 (1  )
b (8s+ 27)2 r( ; s)2
e;
where
e = 3s3 (555   (2222  1769))   8s5 (1 + ) (3  5) + 4s4 (21 +  (130  203))
   15 552 (1  )2   9  s2 (1009   (2450  1429)) + 18s (1  ) (43  27) :
There is no closed form solutions for the value of s that solves e = 0. Figure 4 below
are the graphs of the function e for di¤erent values of  . As graphically displayed
by the Figure 4 if  = 1
2
the values of s must lie between 1 and 4 and e is positive
for all s 2 (1:23; 2:26) and if  = 0, the values of s must lie between 3
2
and 8 and e is
positive for all s. Also e decreases with  for all s. For s 2 (1:23; 2:26), since e > 0
for  = 1
2
, then e decreases with  implies e > 0 for all  and therefore OT > O.
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For a given s =2 (1:23; 2:26), since e < 0 for  = 1
2
and e > 0 for  = 0, then e
decreases with  implies there is a critical value e such that e Q 0 whenever  R e .
Then we have e Q 0, and therefore OT Q O, whenever  R e .
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-10000
0
10000
s
Figure 4. Graphs of the function e (s) for di¤erent values of  : 0 (thin dotted
curve); 0:1 (thick dotted curve); 0:2 (dashed curve); 0:3 (thin gray curve); 0:4 (thick
gray curve); and 0:5 (thick black curve).
If  () < s < h(), then OT < O.
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0,  () < s < h(). Since the sign of
OT   T is positive, we discuss the sign of O   O T in order to characterize the
SPE in this region of parameters. For s =  (), the equation above yields e < 0
for all  : Since e < 0 if s =  (), then e decreases with  implies e < 0 for all
s >  () and therefore OT < O.
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